A Treatise of Human Nature

This is an annotated version of the book1. contains an updated biography of the author at the end of the book for a better understanding of the text.2. This book has been checked and corrected for spelling errorsNothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend todiscover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, thanto insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those,which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content withlamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most importantquestions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there arefew, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readilyagree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, toperceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtainedthe greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highestto accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust,consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts,and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with inthe systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawndisgrace upon philosophy itself.Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the presentimperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doorsmay, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goesnot well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate,and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The mosttrivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentouswe are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied,as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with thegreatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustleit is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and noman needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravaganthypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourablecolours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage thepike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians ofthe army.From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice againstmetaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who professthemselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part ofliterature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those onany particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which isany way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. Wehave so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonlyreject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be aprey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural andentertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism,along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion tometaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity,it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shallarrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failedwith the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vainand presumptuous. I pretend to no such advantage in the philosophy I amgoing to unfold, and would esteem it a strong presumption against it,were it so very easy and obvious.It is evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less,to human nature: and that however wide any of them may seem to run fromit, they still return back by one passage or another. Even. Mathematics,Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependenton the science of MAN; since the lie under the cognizance of men, andare judged of by their powers and faculties. It is impossible to tellwhat changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were wethoroughly